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Article 9

FROM CIVIL LITIGATION TO PRIVATE JUSTICE:
LEGAL PRACTICE AT WAR WITH THE PROFESSION
AND ITS VALUES
Bryant Garth*
The lawyer tempted by repose should recall the heavy costs paid by
his profession when needed legal reform has to be accomplished
through the initiative of public-spirited laymen. Where change must

be thrust from without upon an unwilling Bar, the public's least
flattering picture of the lawyer seems confirmed.
There are few great figures in the history of the Bar who have not
concerned themselves with the reform and improvement of law.1

INTRODUCTION
Legal practice and the legal profession are at odds with
one another, and they have been since at least the late 1970s.
Aggressive litigation practices reshaped the meaning of litigation, gave rise to new values and brought forth demands for
reform that traditional institutions could not handle. Such
practices also set the stage for a much more serious crisis in
professional values today. The profession has not and may not
find a way to blend some variant of a traditional approach to
courts and litigation with the emerging world of private justice
and entrepreneurial legal competition. Success in that venture
requires a switch in professional focus from values based on
trials to values based generally on dispute resolution.
This Article addresses the tension--or even contradiction-between the legal profession and legal practice. I develop
both a sociological perspective and a suggested line of legal

' Director, American Bar Foundation. The author would like to thank Carole
Silver and Elizabeth Mertz for very helpful assistance and criticism.
' Professional Responsibility: Report on the Joint Conference of The A.B.
the Association of American Law Schools, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1217 (1958).

and
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analysis. The sociological aspect seeks to give a coherent explanation of where we are in the legal profession and how we got
there. The legal aspect offers some suggestions for a legal analysis that might help to confront our dilemmas. In making suggestions for a new ethical approach, I am of course replicating
the tension or contradiction just mentioned. I hope to suggest a
way that the profession might overcome what the sociological
study of practice shows to be a very difficult problem.
This Article approaches these issues in six parts. The first
part discusses the sociology of the legal profession, providing
an orientation for the following parts. The second part uses the
texts of the organized bar to set out the traditional professional
values toward civil justice. This part concentrates on what I
term the traditional values and traditional crises.
The third part confronts the more recent crisis-the challenge of aggressive litigation practice in the new era of legal
innovation unleashed by deregulation in the late 1970s. My
thesis is that an escalation in litigation warfare changed the
rules, posing great difficulties for the traditional professional
approach.
The fourth part discusges recent and current efforts to
control these legal practices. The effort by the organized bar
and other professional organizations, primarily through exhortations, case management and alternative dispute resolution,
has not been very successful. More success has come from
developments in the market for legal services and, in particular, from the new power of in-house counsel. In-house counsel
have used their economic power to require law firms to offer a
variety of services, especially lower-cost forms of alternative
dispute resolution. These developments, however, have in turn
created other quite serious problems.
The fifth part points to the general problem of remaking
professional values in this new era of competition. The sociological dimension, posed powerfully by Judge Posner, 2 questions whether, in an age of increasing professional competition,
there is any place to assert professional values against the
competitive reality of legal practice. Assuming this problem is
somehow avoided or postponed, there is also a legal problem.
Richard Posner, The Material Basis of Jurisprudence, 69 IND. L.J. 1, 1-3
(1993).
2
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We need to find some way in legal doctrine to take professional
values built on public court trials and apply them to the competitive private-public field of dispute resolution. In particular,
in addition to the profession's traditional values of access,
efficiency and quality of public processes, we need to focus on
the quality of information about the more or less private machinery that has gained increasing importance in dispute resolution.
I.

APPROACHES

TO

THE

SOCIOLOGY

OF

THE

LEGAL

PROFESSION

The principal issue that comes from legal sociology simply
concerns the role of the organized legal profession.' One view,
promoted forcefully by Richard Abel, is that the organized bar
works mainly to protect the incomes and status of lawyers-with varying degrees of success-either by attempting to
restrict the supply of lawyers (e.g., through law school accreditation), or by promoting their demand (e.g., through legal
aid).4 Other writers have sought to rehabilitate the organized
bar from this narrowly self-interested role, suggesting that
professional organizations do at times provide outlets for "public interest" activities.5 According to this view, lawyers actively
promote legal aid not so much because it serves their self-interest but because they are seeking to improve the administration of justice. This suggestion of lawyer idealism leads to findings that in their public, idealistic role as members of the organized bar and in other professional activities, lawyers often
seek to clean up the messes they make through a legal practice
directed mainly toward maximizing their incomes.6 From this
perspective lawyers are involved in the civil justice debate in

' Because the sociological approach taken in this Article is not common in the
literature, I begin with a brief discussion of approaches to the sociology of the
legal profession that are relevant to the issues of the profession and legal practice.
See, e.g., RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS (1989).
' See, e.g., TERRENCE C. HALLIDAY, BEYOND MONOPOLY: LAWYERS, STATE CRISIS PROFESSIONAL EMPOWERmENT (1987); MICHAEL J. POWELL, FROM PATRICIAN TO
PROFESSIONAL ELITE: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE NEW YORK CITY BAR ASSOCIATION (1988).

' Robert W. Gordon, The Ideal and the Actual in the Law: Fantasies and
Practices of New York City Lawyers, 1870-1910, in THE NEW HIGH PRIESTS: LAWYERS IN POST-CIVIL WAR AMERICA (Gerald W. Gawalt ed., 1984).
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two ways: they are responsible for the debate by engaging in
selfish practices that promote litigation and delay, and they
seek to reform the system that they have led astray.
While lawyers look like villains under either analysis,
certain sociological research suggests that practices that promote problems in civil justice are the result mainly of client
demands. According to these theorists, lawyers are not "autonomous;"7 they respond to demand. While lawyers may seek
business selfishly, changes in the general social world' and the
world of business9 have made the public expect more of, and
have more recourse to, the law. The legal profession, we could
say, offers a known product. It is the demand that changes.
While this demand-side view should have some appeal to
the legal profession, like the account that blames everything on
lawyer selfishness or greed, it is much too simple. It leaves out
the impact caused by how the legal profession approaches
practice and reform. First, lawyers should be seen as neither
passive nor all-controlling in the lawyer-client relationship.
The way lawyers practice has an inevitable impact on clients
and how they use the legal system. The supply side of legal
practice interacts with client demands; and the technology of
lawyering, as we shall see, is changing rapidly. Second, professional bar activities and other lawyer public service must be
linked to the private practice-or better, the careers-of lawyers. As the beginning quotation suggests, successful lawyers
who aspire to become "great" lawyers-with the prestige and
wealth this status typically brings-have been drawn to "public-spirited" civil justice issues, whether their "motives" were
self-interested or to further the public interest. This activity is
not only a matter of conscience. The activists in organized legal
professions undoubtedly defend the basic system that supports
their constituency, but they also seek to manage-through self-

JOHN P. HEINz & EDWARD 0. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL
STRUCTURE OF THE BAR (1982); ROBERT L. NELSON, PARTNERS WITH POWER: THE
SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE LARGE LAW FIRM (1988).
8 See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, TOTAL JUSTICE (1985) (discussing a soci-

etal transformation in expectations which leads to more of a willingness to litigate).
9 See, e.g., MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRM (1991) (discussing, in part, the increase in
business litigation).
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interest or idealism, which for present purposes makes no
difference-the work and bring it into line with the more
"transcendent" values and interests of the legal profession.'"
Understanding the role of lawyers in civil justice reform thus
requires an understanding of the relationship among legal
professional approaches to reform, legal practice and legal
careers in the profession." This Article seeks to bring these
strands together.

II. THE ORGANIZED BAR AND CIVIL JUSTICE: TRADITIONAL
VALUES, TRADITIONAL CRISES
The public positions of the organized bar form the background for the story of the legal profession and civil justice.
Civil justice debates are bound to involve the organized bar,
and the organized bar is where researchers have typically
looked for the public-spirited activities of lawyers in civil justice reform. The positions of the organized bar turn out to be
instructive, because we can point to a fairly stable set of beliefs
found in the texts of the organized bar.
The starting point for the organized bar has been the justice system as currently structured: courts, lawyers, adversaries and litigation. Not surprisingly, the bar's instincts have
been to tinker with but, not change this general setup. Nevertheless, the bar has a very strong interest in making this
structure look good. The bar's moderate reform program, we
can say, reacts to what can be termed as the "good old crises,"
because these crises do not appear to threaten the general structure.'
See Lauren K. Robel, Grass Roots Procedure: Local Advisory Groups and the
Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 879 (1993) (showing how lawyers involved in the local committees, which were established to help plan for
local federal district courts, assume a "non-political stance").
" This approach comes from the works of Yves Dezalay, including Marchands
de droit (1992) (forthcoming English translation, Northwestern University Press).
See also Robert L. Nelson & David M. Trubek, Arenas of Professionalism: The
Professional Ideologies of Lawyers in Collective and Workplace Contexts, in
10

LAWYERS' IDEALS)LAWYERS' PRACTICES: TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL
PROFESSION (Robert L. Nelson et al., eds., 1992) [hereinafter LAWYERS' IDEALS].
12 An historical example of a more fundamental crisis from the perspective of
the organized bar was the development of administrative agencies in the New
Deal period. These agencies appeared to threaten the superiority of courts. See,

e.g., MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960, at
231-38 (1992).
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The consensus reform package starts with the basic idea,
which goes back at least to the 1908 Canons of Professional
Ethics, that lawyers should act to improve the administration
of justice. 3 According to the general consensus, the center of
attention for the administration of justice is public courts,
where laws are to be applied by judges and juries. The public
must have faith in the legitimacy of the courts to avoid resort
to non-legal, violent or self-help remedies; the ideal image
upon which these values are built is that of an individual with
access to a relatively quick decision by a judge or jury after a
trial on the merits. Thus, the public image of courts is affected
by delays or other problems in the operation of the civil justice
system.
A second and related idea is that lawyers should work to
improve the quality and political independence of judges, yielding a particular enthusiasm for "merit selection." 4 And a
third idea, of somewhat more recent vintage, is that the bar
has a duty to ensure access to civil justice for those who cannot
afford legal services." In the famous words of Judge Learned
Hand, "Thou shalt not ration justice." 6
We can find these concerns in the various codes of professional responsibility; 7 in the report of the ABA's Stanley
Commission on "Lawyer Professionalism," issued in 1986;"8 in

"sCanon 29 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics, adopted in 1908, called
for efforts to improve the administration of justice. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 29 (1908). Canon 8 of the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility stated that "A lawyer should assist in improving the legal system." MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 8 (1980). This idea is now in Rule
6.1 of the Model Rules. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 6.1 (1983).
14 Canon 2 of the 1908 Canons states, "It is the duty of the Bar to endeavor
to prevent political considerations from outweighing judicial fitness in the selection
of Judges." CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 2 (1908).
11 EARL L. JOHNSON, JR., JUSTICE AND REFORM: THE FORMATIVE YEARS OF THE
OEO LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAM (1974).
"' ABA, Blueprint for Improving the Civil Justice System, in 1992 ABA WORKING GROUP ON CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM PROPOSALS REPORT, iv. (1992) [hereinafter
ABA Blueprint].
"7 Canon 2 of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, which refers to the
"duty to make legal counsel available," cites authorities that go back to the period
immediately after World War II. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Canon 2' (1980); see also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 6.1
(1983).
'8 See generally COMMISSION ON PROFESSIONALISM, ABA, IN THE SPIRIT OF
PUBLIC SERVICE: A BLUEPRINT FOR REKINDLING LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM (1986).
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countless reports on court delay and on access problems; 9 in
committees and task forces;2" in the lobbying activities of the
ABA in Washington, D.C.; and recently in the official ABA
Blueprint for Improving the Civil Justice System' ("Blueprint") issued in response to Vice President Quayle's criticisms
of the legal profession and his recommendations for change
made through the President's Council on Competitiveness. The
Blueprint in particular warrants close consideration.
The initial themes of the Blueprint recognize the crucial
importance of the justice system, which "provides citizens with
a way to resolve disputes peacefully and protects individual
rights and property,"22 and the threat to that system through
"overload and underfunding."' The Blueprint then proceeds
through four familiar headings: (1) access to justice;' (2) justice system funding;25 (3) judicial excellence;2 6 and (4) improving the management of litigation." It is fair to say that
the organized bar is reasonably comfortable with these topics
and sincere in the desire to improve the justice system in all
four areas. No responsible member of the organized bar would
oppose any of these goals in principle. Achieving these aims
would comport with the ideal civil justice system from the
point of view of the organized bar. The public court system
would be available to bring the rule of law efficiently to all
those who sought to vindicate their legal rights, and lawyers
could represent clients through the adversary system confident
that the other side also would be represented.
The organized bar has supported many reforms consistent
with the ideals of court efficiency and bringing law to the people, including various programs for legal services for the poor,
19 ATTACKING LITIGATION

COSTS AND DELAY: FINAL REPORT OF THE ACTION

COMMISSION TO REDUCE COURT COSTS AND DELAY (1984); see, e.g., ABA ACTION

COMMISSION TO REDUCE COURT COSTS AND DELAY, ABA CONSORTIUM ON LEGAL
SERVICES AND THE PUBLIC, CIVIL JUSTICE: AN AGENDA FOR THE 1990S (1991) [here-

inafter CIVIL JUSTICE].
" See, for example, the ABA Special Committee on "Funding the Justice System."
21 See generally ABA Blueprint, supra note 16.
22

Id. at iii.

2' Id.

21 Id.
25 Id.

at iv.
at v.

26 Id.

at vi.

27

Id.
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proposals to increase access through attorney fee shifting and
efforts to build support for legal services for middle income
personnel.28 The bar largely has welcomed what the ABA has
termed "an ever increasing reliance on the justice system to
vindicate the rights and claims of all Americans."2 9 The studies of "legal needs" commissioned by the bar 30 have also been
consistent with this aim. The organized bar supports the principle of inclusiveness within the institution of the legal system.
Access is always a major theme.
I do not mean that the legal profession's organizations
have ever succeeded in making the civil justice system conform
to these ideals. But the legal profession has been able to manage these traditional crises in the litigation system sufficiently
to protect the profession's legitimacy. The profession could
point to programs that promoted the basic values and make it
at least imaginable that the actual could plausibly be measured by the ideal."
III. THE CHALLENGE OF LITIGATION PRACTICE IN THE NEW ERA
OF INNOVATION

The position of the organized bar had a wonderful logic
that worked very well when the major challenges to the profession came from outsiders who wanted to get in. New voices in
our society could demand their legal rights, and the profession
could respond by calling for access, new and better courts and
subsidized legal services. The civil rights movement, the consumer movement, the environmental movement and women's
groups could be supported in their efforts to use the legal system to claim and expand their legal rights. There were challenges to the legal profession, but the leaders of the profession
could operate from a position of some strength, asserting the

28 The organized bar, however, did resist group legal services, advertising and
price competition, only to have the Supreme Court overrule it in all these areas.
The commitment to access was at that time not a commitment to foster overt
competition and innovation in the delivery of legal services.
29 See ABA Blueprint, supra note 16, at iii.
20

BARBARA A. CuRRAN, THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE PUBLIc: THE FINAL REPORT

OF A NATIONAL SURvEY (1977) (a final report of a national survey by the Special

Committee to survey legal needs).
3 See generally Gordon, supra note 6.
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unfairness of denials of access.
A set of new challenges, however, has been more difficult
to confront. Legal practice itself, in fact, became the problem.
The Reagan and Bush administrations' critique had such power because it tapped into criticisms widely shared within the
legal profession." This critique was built on the observation
that litigation became not only much more adversarial and
costly, but also much more frequent in business relationships
that had generally stayed away from courts. 3 One indicator
of the increased importance of litigation was that in the mid1970s the ABA formed a "section" on litigation, distinguishing
litigation from general practice. The litigation section has
grown into the largest practice section in the ABA. The main
source of this special focus on litigation, it appears, was the
change in business disputing that took place in the 1970s and
1980s. 34
There are a number of possible explanations for this increase in business litigation. One possibility is that business
competition simply intensified,35 leading to more disputes and
more lawsuits. Another is that the homogeneity of the managerial group of very large corporations declined, making resolving
disputes informally, for example, over dinner at a club,36 more
difficult. These explanations are consistent with the idea that
lawyers mainly respond passively to client demand. Business,
according to this explanation, simply called on lawyers to sue
other businesses more often. The profession was unable to
resist the desires of paying clients. Indeed, there is clearly
much to this demand-side story that rings true.
Ronald Gilson, however, offers an account that, while
recognizing the increase in demand, blames the change in
litigation practice on what might be termed a decline in the
morality of legal practice. He attributes the relative lack of
32 PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, AGENDA FOR CrvIL JUSTICE REFORM IN AMERICA 1-4 (1991).
-

Id.

" See Marc Galanter & Joel Rogers, The Transformation of Business Disputing:

Some Preliminary Observations (Paper for Law & Society Association Annual Meeting, Vail, Colo. 1988) (on file with the author); see also NELSON, supra note 7;
William E. Nelson, Contract Litigation and the Elite Bar in New York City, 19601980, 39 EMORY L.J. 413, 414-15 (1990).
See generally Galanter & Rogers, supra note 34.
36 See generally Nelson, supra note 34.
See Ronald J. Gilson, The Devolution of the Legal Profession: A Demand Side
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what he calls strategic litigation-litigation designed merely to
gain economic advantage-in the past to the professional role
of lawyers as "gatekeepers." 8 Lawyers, he suggests, were able
to use their ethical position and their ability to label a lawsuit
as "groundless" to resist their clients' efforts to engage them
for economic warfare.3 9 He then posits, however, that the
growth of in-house counsel undermined the gatekeeper function.4" In-house counsel promoted strategic lawsuits by insisting on finding some legal basis for lawsuits that could be
brought for other business-related reasons. Law firms were
unable to resist because of a structural breakdown in professional morality.4 '
But none of these explanations-increased business conflict, a decline in business networks or a decline in professional
morality-is completely satisfactory. Nevertheless, understanding changes in business disputing is very important for the
subject of civil justice reform. Adequate explanations of historical change can suggest what kinds of remedies might work
and, indeed, just how much of a problem there is. While no one
can say for sure at this point what produced this litigation
boom, bringing supply and demand side explanations together
produces a more inclusive and dynamic account.
A dynamic account starts with the proposition that both
the world of corporations and legal business became much
more competitive in the 1970s and 1980s. Deregulation in the
legal profession resulted in part from some of the reforms enacted in the name of access." The legal profession also felt
increased competition because of the rise of in-house counsel
actively shopping for legal services. Further, there were simply
more lawyers available to compete and take advantage of the
fewer restrictions on client-getting behavior. Finally, in addition to competition from lawyers, financial and other service

Perspective, 49 MD. L. REV. 869, 872 (1990).
38 Id.
31 Id.

at 882.
at 887.

40 See Robert E. Rosen, The Inside Counsel Movement, Professional Judgment,
and OrganizationalRepresentation, 64 IND. L.J. 479, 480 (1989).
41 Cf Robert W. Gordon & William H. Simon, The Redemption of Professionalism, in LAWYERS' IDEALS, supra note 11, at 230.
42 An example is lawyer advertising, which permits much more of a public
relations effort by law firms as well.
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providers put other pressures on lawyers seeking to maintain
their position in advising businesses.
Competition as a matter of course rewards entrepreneurial
innovation, and such innovation surely intensified in the 1970s
and 1980s. The premium on entrepreneurialism in lawyering,
moreover, makes practicing lawyers perhaps more willing to
stretch the limits of what the organized profession might prefer. The fact that lawyers innovate to compete has practically
gone unnoticed in writing about the legal profession.43
Individual lawyers gain a competitive advantage either by
offering "better" services, which enable them to charge a premium or attract more business, or by processing a higher volume of cases at a lower cost to the law firm." It is clear that
we have seen innovation in the mass production side, with
personal injury lawyers becoming much more efficient with
relatively small claims, and with the development of multioffice practices such as Hyatt Legal Services and Jacoby and
Meyers.4 5 It is not clear whether these innovations in fact
have increased the number of individual lawsuits, but they
have helped some lawyers be successful with relatively small
cases. Entrepreneurial innovation, which includes the use of
computer and other information technologies, is now part of
legal practice for small claims and, as we shall see, for large
ones as well.
But the most important change is the rise of what Marc
Galanter termed "mega-litigation."46 Until at least the 1970s,

' Former Governor of Illinois James Thompson, Chair of Winston & Strawn,
noted candidly that "tihere really is a parallel between a successful corporation
and a successful law firm in terms of the need to constantly reinvent yourIf you're just like six other law firms in town, or in the country, why is
self ....
somebody going to choose you rather than somebody else?" Quoted in William
Grady et al., Chairman Thompson's Theory of Law Firm Evolution, CHI. TRIB.,
Aug. 10, 1993, § 3, at 1; see also Michael J. Powell, Professional Innovation: Corporate Lawyers and Private Law Making, 18 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 423 (1993).
" For the economic theory of competitive advantage, see JOEL MOKYR, THE
LEVER OF RICHES: TECHNOLOGICAL CREATIVITY AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS (1990).
"5See Carroll Seron, Managing EntrepreneurialLawyers: A Variation on Traditional Practice, in LAWYERS' IDEALS, supra note 11, at 3, 77; J. VAN HOY, PREPACKAGED LAW: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY AND ORGANIZATION OF ROUTINE WORK AT
MULTI-BRAND LEGAL SERVICES FIRMS (1993).
" Marc Galanter, Mega-Law and Mega-Lawyering in the Contemporary United
States, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE PROFESSIONS: LAWYERS, DOCTORS AND OTHERS
152 (Robert Dingwall & Phillip Lewis eds., 1983).
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law firms did not feel any competitive pressure to innovate in
developing litigation as a form of economic warfare. But at
that time, clients began to shop more for lawyers, aided by the
growth of in-house counsel mentioned before. At the same
time, the business world's increased competitiveness made
businesses eager to take advantage of whatever was available
for economic warfare, including the law. Business innovation
includes not only new products and marketing strategies, but
also using new tactics to compete. Conservative law firms
found that they had to innovate or they would lose business to
new, aggressive entrants into the legal services market, like
Skadden, Arps" Law firms were no longer so prepared to
assert the ethics of the profession and turn down legal business and litigation once deemed unproductive or frivolous.
They had to compete to survive, and clients wanted the benefits that strategic litigation could bring.
Business litigation increased, and there was competition
within business litigation. The principal forms of innovation in
litigation, it appears, were methods that escalated legal conflicts. Every aspect of lawsuits became contested. Lawyers
could make life very difficult for any opposing business by
taking advantage of the open-ended nature of discovery under
Federal Rule 26, proliferating depositions and requests for
documents or fighting aggressively to resist such requests.
Discovery practice in the 1970s became the key to the practice
of corporate litigation.
Many legal developments of the past two decades can be
related to innovations designed to raise the stakes. One prominent example was the use of civil RICO as a way to turn a
breach of contract or tort claim into a conspiracy which can
result in punitive damages.48 Proliferating claims for punitive
damages increase the pressure on corporate defendants. Another example is the creation of a whole new form of attack
through disqualification motions for conflict of interest.49 And
47 See LINCOLN CAPLAN, SKADDEN: POWER, MONEY, AND THE RISE OF A LEGAL
EMPmE (1993).
, See, e.g., Petra J. Rodriguez, Note, The Civil RICO Racket: Fighting Back
with FederalRule of Civil Procedure 11, 64 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 931, 936-39 (1990).
" See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Sources of Delays, Motions to Disqualify Could
Be Handled Promptly Through ADR, 11 ALT. HIGH COST LITIG. 91 (1993); Susan
P. Shapiro, Regulating Conflict of Interest: The Case of the Large Law Firm (Paper
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outside of pure business litigation, the trends in class actions
and mass personal injury litigation followed the same approach."0 Litigation tactics escalate the conflicts by using
whatever tools are available to pressure the other side into a
favorable settlement.
It has become quite normal now to describe business litigation as strategic in the sense used earlier, and the ethics of
those who file such lawsuits and engage in these kinds of legal
warfare are now rarely questioned. A recent New York Times
article noted that "[brokerage houses.., have resorted to
suits to try to prevent successful brokers from moving to competitors, and, in high technology and other scientific industries,
such suits may become competitive tools to help a company
keep its edge-or to blunt others."5 ' Similarly, a recent New
York Law Journal article refers to "infringement suits as a
business intimidation strategy."5 2 The recognition that litigation is often merely a weapon in business competition has
become almost commonplace.5 3
Outside of the high-tech and big business areas, the story
of high stakes litigation in David Margolick's Undue Influence 4 details the methods and tactics of strategic litigation
handled by some of the best lawyers and law firms in the country. The outcome of the estate contest described in the book is
also notable. As Margolick states,
[t]he children could never actually win their case [against their
father's will]; the object had to be settlement. But for that to work,
Milbank needed a scorched-earth brand of litigator, someone who

for Annual Meeting of Law and Society Association, Chicago, Ill., May 1993) (on
file with the author).
5 Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Really Matter? A Study of Settlements
in Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497 (1991); Anthony Borden, The
Shareholder Suit Charade, AM. LAW., Dec. 1989, at 67-71.
"' James Bennet, Who Owns Ideas and Papers is Issue in Company Lawsuit,
N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 1993, § 1, at 11.

Slind-Flor, High-Tech Needs, NAT'L. L.J., July 5, 1993, at 1, 34.
See, e.g., Milo Geyelin, Feuding Firms Cram Courts, Study Says, WALL ST.
J., Dec. 31, 1990, § 1, at 9 ("[Blusinesses have come to think of litigation as a
management strategy."). The arbitrator in a dispute between Intel and Advanced
Micro Devices wrote in his opinion that he was bothered by the "incessant warfare" and the use of litigation as a "corporate strategy" by both sides. Arbitral
Remedies Must Bear 'Rational Relationship' With Contract: Award Remanded, 4
52 Victoria

World Arb. & Med. Rep. (BNA) 153, 154 (June 1993).

"I

DAVID MARGOLICK, UNDUE INFLUENCE (1993).
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could make life so miserable... that they would eventually have to
surrender. The more wretched they could be made to be, the higher
the price they'd pay."

Settlement out of court is the paradigmatic result of big litigation. Teams of lawyers, working feverishly, use the tools of
discovery and motion practice to try to raise the settlement
value of their side of the case. The result of the new era of
business and professional competition in the 1970s and 1980s,
in sum, was scorched earth litigation, undertaken largely for
business reasons, which lead to settlements out of court.
It is not at all surprising that we found increased evidence
of "Rambo tactics" during this period. Litigators sought to
utilize every possible device at their disposal, and their clients
at that time were both willing and able to pay. The best litigating firms gained business advantages for themselves and their
clients from these very expensive tactics. This aggressive litigation, however, was not helpful to the organized bar as
such-even if law firms grew and prospered enormously.56
The Commission on Professionalism established in late 1984
by the ABA expressed alarm over precisely these developments:
Often, it is clients who ask lawyers to prosecute or defend minor,
frivolous, or perhaps not-so-minor cases through 'scorched earth'
tactics. The lawyer has an obligation to the legal system in his capacity as an officer to the court to dissuade the client from pursuing
matters that should not be in court in the first place, and from using
tactics geared primarily to drain the financial resources of the other
side. 7

But while the organized profession and academics concerned
with professionalism called for self-restraint and emphasized
duties to the court and to the system of justice, the lawyer-aslitigator quite naturally sought to win advantages for clients
through whatever tactics would work. It is not a surprise, thus,

"

Id. at 198.

According to Steven Brill, "[Alt least a third of the lawyer time now spent
on a typical litigation is wasted." Stephen Brill, The Coming Crisis: Lopping Off a
Third, AM. LAW., June 1993, at 5. Brill noted that "One of the overcapacity problems that that group of managing partners and general counsel focused on was
litigation." Id. See generally GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 9; NELSON, supra note
7.
57 COMMISSION ON PROFESSIONALISM, supra note 18, at 30.
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that litigation seemed to be "out of control."
This trend, however, does not mean that routine litigation
was out of control. There is no real evidence, for example, that
private individuals were resorting to the courts more often.5"
Similarly, we cannot document any evidence of routine discovery abuse. 9 It is probably true that some of the aggressive
tactics of high stakes litigation became more common throughout the legal profession, but I am unaware of any systematic
evidence on that issue. What does seem clear, though, is that
lawyers in high stakes disputes tended literally to pull out all
the stops, pushing ahead with any tactic that offered some
prospect for a strategic advantage. This litigation was the
problem, even if commentary often tended to focus attention
elsewhere.'
IV. CONTROLLING "RUNAWAY" LEGAL PRACTICES

The Organized Bar's Response: Case Management and
ADR

A.

Aside from the expressions of alarm and calls for professionalism that continue to echo throughout the organized
Marc Galanter, The Life and Times of the Big Six; or, The Federal Court
Since the Good Old Days, 1988 WISC. L. REV. 921, 951-53.
"' See Randall Samborn, Reports: Little Discovery Abuse, NATL. L.J., May 31,
1993, at 3 (reporting on two studies by the National Center for State Courts); cf.
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery Vices and Trans-Substantive Virtues in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2237 (1989):
Discovery of documents in cases involving the conduct of business or
government often proceeds by a vicious game in which the respondent
has every incentive to trim and cheat. Highly developed dialectical skills
have evolved. One skill is that of construing a documents demand so
that it does not reach the very smoking gun document that the responding lawyer holds in her hand. Another skill is that of instructing the
paralegals, without actually saying so, to bury the important documents
in a pile of paper chaff or to fail to find the important documents in the
first place. Still another skill is dividing search responsibility with the
client so that the latter takes care of documents that can be made to
disappear. The prevalence of such underside discovery practice cannot be
measured, for evident reasons. It is believed to be pervasive enough,
however, to sustain widespread suspicion and cynicism among the trial
bar. This effect is itself sufficient cause to question the present discovery
rules.
Id. at 2240.
" See Galanter, supra note 58, at 951-52.
'
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bar," case management and alternative dispute resolution
("ADR") are the only real sources of control over practice asserted by the profession. Although each of these approaches
was developed for purposes other than to control strategic and
scorched-earth litigation, they since have been adapted to combat these new problems.
Case management developed originally with a relatively
simple mission: to end delays promoted for the convenience of
lawyers at the expense of clients.62 The idea simply was to
overcome problems of delay by encouraging judges to take
more control of the timing of the proceedings. For example,
judges could impose firm dates for discovery and trial to prevent lawyers from ignoring their cases or engaging in delay
tactics. Also, when "complex" cases began to proliferate after
some famous antitrust cases in the 1960s, the Judicial Panel
on Multidistrict Litigation, created in 1968, published the
Manual for Complex Litigation, which encourages case management.63 Moreover, every book and article produced by the
organized bar about the problem of delay emphasizes active
case management by judges.'
ADR had a similarly low-key entrance into the bar's approach to civil justice reform. ADR became a part of the vocabulary of civil justice reform in the mid-1970s, gaining attention
with the Pound Revisited Conference in 1976.65 Co-sponsored

by the Judicial Conference, the Conference of Chief Justices
and the ABA, the Pound-Conference in part was a response to
a perceived litigation explosion. But the primary emphasis was
An example would be the movement to establish "Inns of Court" to civilize
litigation practice.
62 On the history of case management, see generally Judith Resnik, Managerial
Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 376 (1982). See also CARROLL SERON & WOLF
HEYDEBRAND, RATIONALIZING JUSTICE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FEDERAL DisTRICT COURTS (1990).
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (2d ed. 1985). The concerns developed in
the 1960s after the price fixing convictions of manufacturers of electrical equipment, which led to "nearly 2000 private treble damage actions involving 25,000
claims." RICHARD L. MARCUS & EDWARD F. SHERMAN, COMPLEX LITIGATION 3
(1985).
64 See, e.g., MAUREEN SOLOMON & DOUGLAS K. SOMERLOT, CASEFLOW
MANAGEMENT IN THE TRIAL COURT (1987).
65 See JERALD
S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW? (1983); CHRISTINE B.
HARRINGTON, SHADOW JUSTICE: THE IDEOLOGY AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF ALTERNATIVES TO COURT (1985).
61
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on access: "the delivery of justice to all."66 What was new was
the focus not only on access to courts, but also on access to
other "varieties of dispute processing," such as those outlined
by Frank Sander at the Conference.6 7 For the ABA at the
time, the major concern was small claims and "minor" criminal
matters, which lawyers typically did not wish to handle. As
Chief Justice Burger stated at the conference, 'Ways must be
found to resolve minor disputes more fairly and more swiftly
than any present judicial mechanisms make possible."" Accordingly, in 1977 the ABA established a Committee on Minor
Disputes. ADR became part of the agenda, although largely
from the emphasis on access.
ADR has grown astronomically and changed dramatically
in its importance to the ABA and to lawyers generally. The
ABA Committee on Minor Disputes quickly became the Committee on Alternative Dispute Resolution and, in 1987, became
the Committee on Dispute Resolution. In 1989, dispute resolution was the major theme of the annual meeting of the ABA.
And in early 1993, the ABA established a formal "section" on
dispute resolution, thus giving ADR equal status with the
section on litigation. In addition, nearly every local and state
bar association has taken up the cause of ADR. According to
one recent source, the number of dispute resolution committees
in bar associations went from zero in 1980 to at least 157 in
1992.69 Moreover, President Bush's Council on Competitiveness was a staunch supporter of ADR. Indeed, ADR certainly
receives as much attention today as does litigation.
The current emphasis on ADR is reflected in the ABA
Blueprint,which makes a very strong presentation on behalf of
ADR and especially the Multi-Door Courthouse proposed by
Professor Sander. In fact, the Blueprint diverges from the
Council on Competitiveness Agenda only where the Agenda
seems to threaten the general value of access to courts. That

" ABA, Report of the Pound Conference Follow-Up Task Force, 74 F.R.D. 159,
166 (1976).
"' Frank E. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, 70 F.R.D. 111 (1976) (promoting especially the "multi-door courthouse").
" Warren E. Burger, Agenda for 2000 A-D.-A Need for Systematic Anticipation, 70 F.R.D. 83, 93 (1976).
" Madeline Crohn, The State of Dispute Resolution, NIDR FORUM, Summer
1992, at 3.
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is, the ABA supports ADR, but as a matter of choice and not
formal coercion: "ADR should not be used to close access to the
courts.

7

°

The new focus on ADR parallels the new focus on case
management. As noted above, even litigation is geared less
toward trials and more toward settlement through various
strategic tactics. To a very great extent, the legal profession,
including the judiciary and the organized bar, has embraced
this shift.71 We speak now of settlement as the norm, and trial as the exception. Case management thus evolved from a tool
designed to combat lawyer inertia into an effort to take on
lawyer aggressiveness. Similarly, many of the forms of ADR
promoted within the courts, including court-annexed arbitration, early neutral evaluations and mini-trials, were promoted
as ways to foster settlement before the expenses of pretrial
skirmishing."
This shift in emphasis has been reflected in significant
changes in the Federal Rules, which are completely consistent
with both of these responses to perceived abuses in litigation
and with the new paradigm of dispute resolution generally.
Yet, none of the major reforms has solved the problems that
were associated with high-stakes litigation. For example, the
revisions of Rule 11 in 1983 sought to deter lawsuits weakly
grounded in law or fact. Similarly, Rule 16 was amended in
1983 to direct judges to manage cases through pretrial conferences. Revised Rule 11 was thus supposed to deter strategic
litigation, and revised Rule 16 was supposed to control pretrial
skirmishing.7" The rules promoting the use of federal magistrates also show concern for discovery matters.
70 CIVIL JUSTICE, supra note 19, at 41.

71 See generally SERON & HEYDEBRAND, supra note 62; Marc Galanter, Settlement Judge, Not a Trial Judge: Judicial Mediation in the United States, 12 J. OF
L. & Soc. 1 (1985); D. Marie Provine, Managing Negotiated Justice: Settlement
Procedures in the Courts, 12 JUST. SYS. J. 91, 91-92 (1987); Judith Resnick, Failing Faith: Adjudication Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CI. L. REV. 494, 535-39
(1986).
72 See Marc Galanter & John Lande, Private Courts and Public Authority, in
12 STUDIES IN LAW, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY (Susan Silbey & Austin Sarat eds.,
1992); Bryant Garth, Privatization and the New Market for Disputes: A Framework
for Analysis and a Preliminary Assessment, 12 STUD. IN L., POL. & SOC'Y 367
(1992);.
"3See David L. Shapiro, Federal Rule 16: A Look at the Theory and Practice of
Rulemaking, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1969, 1985 (1989).
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These reforms, however, had at best a mixed success. Once
placed in the context of adversarial practice, the new Rule 11,
like perhaps other reforms, provided yet one more tactic to be
used in litigation warfare. Adversarial lawyers can run up the
costs, generate delays and multiply the pressures to settle by,
for example, charging the other side with a frivolous filing or
motion. The evidence suggests that strategic litigation continues when the stakes justify it and the clients support it, such
as in the high-tech industry. 4 Thus, the professional reform
efforts have not succeeded in civilizing the disputing process.
There are now other pressures for reform from outside the
traditional professional networks. A coalition of in-house lawyers, legislators and a few others has begun to work together
against the interests of big litigation. The Civil Justice Reform
Act of 1990, which short-circuited the normal reform processes,
is one example. v5 The recently proposed rule of mandatory
disclosure is another one that has been opposed both by plaintiffs and defense lawyers.v6 If taken seriously, mandatory disclosure could reduce pretrial skirmishing about matters to be
discovered and the discovery tools to be used. It thus appears
that a newly powerful and organized sector of the bar has said
that the approach of the mainstream has not gone far enough.
Nevertheless, it is difficult to know whether even these more
dramatic changes would affect the practice of high-stakes litigation.
Indeed, the organized efforts of the legal profession so far
have not been able to control the market-generated litigation
explosion and concomitant adversariness. The failure of controls from the professional side, however, contrasts with powerful controls that have begun to come from within the market
for legal services. It is this new market that is making radical
changes in how lawyers and business resolve disputes.

' See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
: Jeffrey J. Peck, Users United: The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 54 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 105, 109 (1991); Robel, supra note 10, at 879-80.
139,
76 See Carl Tobias, Collision Course in Federal Civil Discovery, 145 F.R.D.
142-43 (1993).
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B. Market Innovations and Solutions
The increased emphasis on ADR did not result only from
generalized criticisms within the legal profession. Leading
business clients began to worry about the arms race in business litigation, which they found expensive and time-consuming. They also realized that as in arms races generally, the real
advantages come only when one side is ahead, which tends to
be a temporary phenomenon. But, as noted previously, inhouse counsel had helped fuel the competition in legal services
and, perhaps, the escalation in litigation as a tactic in economic warfare. In-house counsel have not, as Gilson hoped, revived
a particularly "professional" role as new gatekeepers." They
have not prevented through ethics the use of strategic litigation (or strategic litigation tactics)."8 Gilson's prediction, however, comes very close to describing a related, market-generated phenomenon. The cost-saving rather than professionally
oriented actions of in-house counsel have encouraged an effort
to halt the legal arms race.
The Center for Public Resources ("CPR"), established in
1979, is a major embodiment of the corporate effort to bring
order to the arms race. ' 9 According to a recent brochure, "as
the nation's principal consumer of legal services, the corporation has the greatest incentive to demand change. Thus, the
corporate counsel is the motivating force behind the CPR Legal
Program." ° The centerpiece of the CPR program is a pledge
to seek resolution of disputes short of litigation, and it was
quickly endorsed by many of the most powerful corporations.
The number of endorsements has now reached over 600. Corporate counsel, with a new prestige in the 1980s and the ability to shop for legal services, had the power and the incentive to
see that the basic elements of the pledge were followed---even
endorsed-by the law firms they favored with legal business.
CPR's publication, Alternatives to the High Cost of Litigation,
provides a forum to mobilize opinion and diffuse information
about techniques to avoid litigation. Indeed, the CPR's role is

" Gilson, supra note 37, at 915.
78 Id. at 903-09.
79 CENTER FOR PUBLIC RESOURCES, CORPORATE DISPUTE MANAGEMENT
(1982).
80 CENTER FOR PUBLIC RESOURCES, CPR AGENDA (1992).
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part of a dramatic change in the incentives that law firms face
with respect to litigation and ADR.8"
Moreover, the criticisms of litigation and litigation tactics
came not only from the key players in the national economy,
but, as noted at the Pound Conference, also from a variety of
legal and non-legal critics of the "adversariness" of other kinds
of litigation, especially divorce." As the language and approach of psychologists became more prevalent in American
life generally, not surprisingly they promoted criticisms of the
conflict engendered by contentious divorce proceedings. ADR
thus became a potential slogan and marketing tool for lawyers
providing services to individuals as well as to corporations. In
the new era of legal entrepreneurialism, competition again
fueled innovation in legal practice.
Solo and small-firm lawyers competed for clients by becoming expert in mediation. They naturally emphasized their
legal skills and differentiated themselves from mediators without legal training.' Indeed, there is some evidence that lawyers in effect colonized this area of ADR, gradually gaining
ascendancy over the lay persons who entered this field during
the past two decades.' Lawyers responded to the critiques
and to the competition of non-lawyers, offering somewhat different products in divorce and in other areas of personal practice as well. The organized bar certainly promoted ADR in
response to criticisms of adversariness, but lawyers used those
criticisms as opportunities to gain competitive advantages.
More striking, however, are the changes caused by competition for the bigger business of business and some regulatory
disputes. The stakes are higher, and the clientele is more sophisticated and able to make informed decisions about the best
legal products. A large law firm's litigation department increasingly must respond to the attitudes embodied in CPR.

"1 An example is an agreement within the food industry, akin to an arms
agreement, to try ADR for 90 days prior to filing lawsuits. See Major Food Companies Agree to CPR Plan to Try ADR for 90 Days Before Filing Lawsuits, 16
ALTS. TO THE HIGH COST OF LrnG. 23 (1993).
82

See, e.g., Sander, supra note 67, at 123; ABA, supra note 66, at 176.

See generally ANDREW ABBOTr, THE SYSTEM OF PROFESSIONS: AN ESSAY ON
THE DrviSION OF EXPERT LABOR (1988).
8 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, PursuingSettlement in an Adversary Culture: A Tale
of Innovation Co-Opted or 'The Law of ADR," 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 14 (1991).
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Indeed, the CPR challenge represents an opportunity to be "out
front." Attractive products can win new clients and make the
litigation department more competitive. ADR can represent a
growth industry for large law firms and especially for litigators
under siege.8 5 ADR here, too, represents more than a bar response to criticisms. It has evolved into a highly competitive
practice of law where lawyer skills are used. "Beauty contests"
for legal business increasingly require the contestants to show
talent and experience in ADR.
This emphasis on ADR can be integrated into the huge
litigation departments of large law firms, the legacy of the
litigation boom. The large law firm's litigation department now
offers mediation, arbitration, mediation-arbitration, mini-trials
and the like, and lawyers advise clients on when each of these
variations is desirable. At the same time, the litigator can
suggest the importance of litigation as a weapon held in reserve-for deterrence purposes-while stressing the usefulness
of litigator skills within ADR. It no doubt also helps to gain
clients by suggesting ways to "win" in ADR, even if this may
sometimes undermine the pure, non-legal ADR system." It is
no surprise that the menu of alternatives tends to favor some
advocacy and some presentation of legal arguments. Lawyers
seek to impress clients with the skills they have worked so
hard to develop.
Innovation in law firms is not the only example of the
results of competition for corporate business. There has been a
tremendous proliferation of private (and some public) providers
of dispute resolution services." Some of the key features that
are emerging in a very competitive market are precisely what
we would expect: a full range of private services depending on
what clients are willing to pay. Clients can shop for dispute
resolution by very high-priced private judges selected by them

85 According to James Wilber of Altman Weil, a consulting firm, "The smartest
firms proactively are anticipating that ADR's going to be a fact of life and are
offering. . . this to clients rather than waiting for clients to scream and yell
about the cost of litigation." Carolyn Colwell, Mediators Keep Companies Out of
Court, NEWSDAY, Dec. 21, 1992, at 25; see also Thomas F. Gibbons, When the Firm
Goes Soft: Recession Injects "Value" into the Legal Lexicon, CHI. ENTERPRISE, Jan.Feb. 1983, at 14.
8 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 84 at 35-36.
' See generally Garth, supra note 72.
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or their lawyers. They can move through increasingly adversarial stages-negotiation, mediation, mini-trials or arbitration-to try to resolve disputes. The private trend includes
products ranging from custom justice to mass production jus8
tice masquerading as the "choice" of a client. Legal entrepreneurs have turned ADR from an idea to improve access for
small claims and minor disputes into an almost unrestrained
legal competition. Lawyers seek to use their tools of legal reasoning and adversarial argument, and legal practice is leading
the way to private justice.
Private justice, as we shall see, does not necessarily provide a place for the traditional values of equal access, public
courts and independent judges that have informed the activities of the legal profession as a profession. Indeed, this is one
of the central problems that the profession must confront while
it struggles with how to respond to the many changes that are
occurring in the litigation system.
V.

REMAKING PROFESSIONAL VALUES FOR THE NEW WORLD OF
PRIVATE AND PUBLIC DISPUTE RESOLUTION

The legal profession confronts two issues relating to private justice and its failure to reflect professional values. The
first is whether the organized bar even has a role to play in
seeking to bring such trends in civil justice in line with general
legal principles. As noted before, professional organizations
seek to improve the administration of justice, even where the
problems tend to have been the result of lawyers' practices on
behalf of their clients. Thus, the organized bar and many lawyers sought to reassert "professional values" to stop the arms
race in litigation. Yet, while the bar was active, client demands
and market innovation have been far more effective in containing the explosion in business litigation. We shall therefore
explore whether the legal profession can have anything to say
as a serious counterweight to pure market values. The second
issue is how the profession might remake professional values.
" Cf. Christine B. Harrington & Sally Engle Merry, Ideological Production: The
Making of Community Mediation, 22 L. & SOc' REV. 709 (1988); Lucy V. Katz,
Compulsory Alternative Dispute Resolution and Voluntarism: Two-Headed Monster
or Two Sides of the Coin, 1993 J. DISP. RESOL. 1 ("With the growth of ADR has
come a strong element of compulsion and coercion.").
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A. The Sociology of ProfessionalValues: A Pessimistic View
Privatization and deregulation pose a major challenge to
the legal profession. The threshold question is whether the
competitive pressures in fact preclude professional responses.
Busy lawyers at the competitive margins may not have the
time, energy or will to bother with the kinds of public service
that have traditionally served as a counterweight to practice.
Can the profession'any longer discipline practice?
A recent article by Richard Posner poses the issue in very
striking terms. He argues that "professional" values require a
particular material basis-namely a cartel-and that a cartel
once existed.89 Open competition, however, eliminates cartels
and, therefore, the emphasis on what is "professional." In his
words, "The increasingly competitive character of the legalservices market makes lawyers feel like hucksters rather than
the proud professionals they once were, and brings forward to
positions of leadership in the profession persons whose talents,
for example, for marketing ("rainmaking"), are those of competitive business rather than of professionalism."'
Competing lawyers, according to Posner, are less likely to
embrace the values of the profession, and indeed they will
increasingly compete with non-lawyers as well as lawyers for
business. If this is the case, we cannot expect much of a role
for bar associations and the like in restraining the tendencies
that undermine traditional professional values. The commercial side of practice, we could suggest, will overwhelm the
professional side of the organized profession. Under this analysis, there is simply no place for professional values. They are
the product of a particular cartel, and when the cartel is gone,
gone also will be these professional values. The only value is
what sells.
B. A More Optimistic View
Before accepting such outcomes as the logical result of the
transformation of law from a "cartel-ized" profession to a competitive business, however, we should consider a somewhat

s9 Pqsner, supra note 2, at 23.
90 Id. at 29.
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different interpretation of the relationship between practice
and professional organizational activity. Most practitioners
active in bar association and legal reform activity will define
their activity as unremunerated public service. They will insist
that it goes unrewarded through referrals or new business.
Such a perspective suggests that competition will eliminate
this kind of activity. Sometimes, however, a lawyer will respond to an inquiry about professional activity in the following
manner:
You might ask why a busy litigator will spend so much time in bar
activities and in committees on alternative dispute resolution. My
reform work was the reason I was invited by the state Supreme
Court to address the judges on ADR. I think that I will be taken
more seriously as a lawyer by opponents, by judges, and by my clients because they know that I have sufficient authority to be invited
to lecture to the court on these matters.91

There are many ways to acquire stature in the profession. 2 One way traditionally has been through law reform
and bar activities, which tend to relate. The quotation at the
beginning of this essay suggests the importance of such work
in the career of a notable lawyer. As suggested above, many
lawyers will participate in such work because they have internalized the values of the profession in favor of accessible, welloperating courts and ADR that does not clash with such values. Others, however, may decide to participate in order to
"make their careers" and enhance their stature. The point here
is that it does not matter what the particular motives are as
long as this career pattern continues to work well as a lawyer's
path for success. Success here comes from prestige and income,
which relate but are not linked in all cases. Posner looks only
at short-term economic reward and, thus, he sees no reason for
a rational lawyer to waste time on professional ideology.
We thus have two models of how the organized legal profession can react to civil justice trends. Under one, the increasingly competitive practice simply makes the "professional"
work of the organized bar increasingly irrelevant unless it
contributes narrowly to obtaining legal business. The

91Interview with litigator, May, 1992 (on file with the author).
DONALD D. LANDON, COUNTRY LAWYERS: THE IMPACT OF CONTEXT ON PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE 86, 135 (1990).
92
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schizophrenic aspect-bringing the excesses of practice within
the domain of the profession's universal values-would be lost
for better or worse.
The second model assumes that many lawyers in practice
will feel called upon to make a career in "professional" service
not merely as pro bono, but also as part of an effort to build
their status for effective private practice and, more generally,
for a prestigious legal career. To advance in professional circles, they must advance the universal principles upon which
the profession is based. Of course the choice is not all or nothing. Both models can be found operating at the same time.
What we do not know, however, is how much increased competition will focus all energy on a "business" as opposed to a
"legal" career. There is some truth to Judge Posner's materialist characterization, but I believe we are a long way from what
he contemplates. There is still some life in "professional values," but whether there is enough to assert control over what
the market is doing to practice is very much in doubt.
C.

The Legal Problem in Remaking ProfessionalValues: From
Trials to Dispute Resolution

My contention in this Article is that the legal profession
has not yet come to grips with the trends that have developed
from the intensified competition and privatization of justice. I
will now focus on the responses of the legal profession. Much of
the literature points to the potential horrors of privatization.
Owen Fiss's often-cited article on "against settlement"93 is an
example of this literature. Many of the articles critical of ADR
fall in the same category. 4 Other articles seeking to reassert
constitutional values that authors feel are violated by some
form of ADR, suggest bringing arbitration results under closer
scrutiny by the courts. 5 But much of the literature on alternative dispute resolution simply notes that parties have always
had the right to settle out of court, and private ADR must

'"

Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984).

" Marry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema, 99

HARV. L. REV. 668 (1986).
" See, e.g., IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION-NATIONALIZATION-INTERNATIONALIZATION (1992); Edward Brunet, Arbitration and Constitutional Rights, 71 N.C. L. REv. 81 (1992).
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simply recognize that right.98 Indeed, most cases are settled
out of court if they ever reach the stage of filifig, and most
disputes never reach the stage of a law suit.
It is impossible to harmonize these various literatures.
One side sounds positively nostalgic, invoking a romantic ideal
of litigation culminating in a public trial with an authoritative
pronouncement of public law. This ideal was useful when settlements were viewed as avoided trials. It is not so useful
when trials are viewed as failed settlements, and when there is
a thriving market of public and private products to produce
settlements. The other side, however, is no better. It asserts
that private dispute resolution does not implicate the values of
the legal profession. The only values that are applied are those
of the marketplace. What sells is good enough.
There is a need to develop professional values and corresponding legal principles that can be applied to dispute resolution generally. It is not enough to argue that there should be
access to court, that judges should be independent and that
courts should be efficient. These values do remain important,
but they no longer suffice. The key is to develop the public
interest in private as well as public dispute resolution. There
have so far been only a few efforts in this direction, growing
out of concern with public access to private settlements in
court cases, and with the publicly supported private judging in
California."
No one is going to turn the clock back to the old paradigm
of public trials. The question, therefore, is what responsibility
does the legal profession owe to the public in order for the
public to determine that the dispute resolution system is legitimate, even-handed and accountable. The public must have
information." The legal profession must develop an approach
to the critical information that the public needs about particu-

" See, e.g., Jethro K. Lieberman & James F. Henry, Lessons from the Alternative Dispute Resolution Movement, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 424 (1986); Richard
Chernick, What's Wrong With Private Judging?, L-A. LAW., Nov. 1989, at 19, 21.
97 See, e.g., CAL. JUDICIAL COUNCIL, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE
JUDICIAL COUNCIL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON PRIVATE JUDGES (1991); Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, Public Access to Private Settlements: Conflicting Legal Policies,
111 ALT. HIGH COST L1TIG. 85 (1993); Symposium, Behind Closed Doors: Confidential Settlements and Sealed Court Records, 76 JUDICATURE 303 (1993).
" See generally Garth, supra note 72.
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lar cases in private dispute resolution and about private dispute resolution generally. The courts have problems, but at
least in principle a party has access to a judge's public record
and some ability to hold the judge accountable.
The key to this approach, I believe, is fourfold. First, there
must be some reporting requirements on services that sell
private dispute resolution and on individual providers like
retired judges. They need to disclose, for example, who runs
the service, potential conflicts of interest, repeated client users
and how the public can assess their overall record. Second,
there must be disclosure requirements on mediators, arbitrators and other third-party providers so that consumers will
know what kind of work they do and which clientele they typically serve. One of the key elements of private justice is
"choice" of decisionmakers, and it is the responsibility of the
profession to ensure that choice is informed. Both parties
should have an idea of the "track record" of those called upon
to be a third party, whether arbitrator or mediator.' At present there is a dramatic inequality in access to information in
favor of repeated users. This requirement is parallel to the
long tradition of ensuring that public judges are impartial and
independent. Third, the legal profession must work on a balance between privacy and disclosure in individual cases. The
struggles that take place now concerning what to disclose
about dangerously defective products that are the subject of
settlements in litigation should be generalized to apply to
private forms of dispute resolution.' Finally, it is essential
to encourage systematic evaluations of providers and the services that they offer. It would be possible to apply some minimal licensing scheme or accreditation to programs that submitted to systematic evaluations periodically. Again, this would
allow for better protection of the public users.

9' It is arguable that the track record of the mediator is less important, since
the parties must accept the result for it to be binding, but experienced lawyers
know that the choice of mediator eventually has an impact on what sort of agreement the parties will reach.
1" See supra note 96.
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CONCLUSION

I have sought to develop a method of examining the role of
lawyers and legal practice in civil justice. It may be useful to
state some practical conclusions which necessarily follow, but
which have not all been stated explicitly.
First, lawyers are far from shameless apologists for excessive litigation, delay or scorched-earth tactics. Reformers
should not imagine that the organized bar will simply defend
legal practices contrary to the public interest if they result in
private gain. The wrong way to understand the legal profession
is to see it as a knee-jerk protectionist.
Second, legal practices are a moving target in an era of
increasing competition. Entrepreneurial lawyers respond to
criticism and crises by offering different products, which can
have the effect of transforming the civil justice system. Even as
we learn of abusive litigation practices, market-generated antidotes may make some criticisms moot. The market may of
course revive such practices as well as curb them.
But third, lawyers will not abandon lightly the tools of
their trade, especially legal reasoning and adversarial presentations. When lawyers compete, they sell legal practices. The
practices may and indeed do change, partly in response to
changing social and market conditions, but lawyers cannot be
expected to offer civil justice products that put their own skills
aside (unless they no longer can make a living using legal
skills).
Next, the organized profession has acted as a restraint on
its own membership, not merely because it has historically
been a cartel, but also because lawyers have become eminent
through professional service. That drive for distinction leads to
work on behalf of the universal principles of the profession-the principles which legitimate the profession and the
rule of law. As competition in practice increases, however, it is
not clear how much of a counterweight can be expected. From
one perspective, this is good. The bar can get out of the way of
efficient competition between lawyers and between lawyers
and non-lawyers for services that clients want. From another
perspective, a decline in some of the universal principles embraced by the legal profession, such as the special importance
of public courts and access thereto, is not necessarily to be fa-
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vored.
Finally, if we are to assert professional values over the
new world of private and public dispute resolution, we need to
rethink the model upon which those values are based. We
must confront the fact that focusing on access, the independence of judges and case management is inadequate today. At
a minimum, the new model requires particular attention to the
need for information that will enable individuals and the public to use the services without severe handicaps and to evaluate the services and the providers. The basic challenge to the
profession is to promote these and other professional values
which will protect the public interest in the new world of private justice.

